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Introduction
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has estimated that the world has
less than 30 years to fully decarbonize the global economy and avoid catastrophic and
irreversible climate change.1 Global decarbonization will require tremendous effort and will
have implications for each individual country. As part of the Paris Agreement, states have
committed to limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels. The
International Energy Agency (IEA) has supported the conclusion that the world must achieve
net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, with significant advances by 2030, to have a
chance of reaching this goal.2
To realize a zero-carbon future, 80% of all remaining fossil fuel assets must remain in the
ground,3 and according to the IEA, no new gas or oil fields should be approved, nor should
any new coal mines be developed.4 A rapid phase-out of fossil fuel energy must occur—little
or no fossil fuel energy infrastructure can be built, and much of the existing infrastructure
may need to prematurely retire.
The shipping and transportation sectors—from air travel and cargo shipping to public
transportation systems in cities around the globe—must also be rapidly decarbonized.
Energy effic ienc y standards for automobiles, buildings, and applianc es will need to
tighten. Other c ontributors to industrial emissions, such as the produc tion and
refinement of crucial substances and materials such as cement, steel, and fertilizer must
also be reduced or replaced.5

1 ‘Summary for Policymakers of IPCC
Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C
approved by governments,’ (2018) IPCC,
https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summaryfor-policymakers-of-ipcc-special-reporton-global-warming-of-1-5c-approvedby-governments/; ‘Net Zero by 2050: A
Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector
(2021) International Energy Agency, https://
www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050.

2 ‘Pathway to critical and formidable goal
of net-zero emissions by 2050 is narrow
but brings huge benefits, according to IEA
special report,’ (2021) International Energy
Agency, https://www.iea.org/news/
pathway-to-critical-and-formidable-goalof-net-zero-emissions-by-2050-is-narrowbut-brings-huge-benefits.

3 Christopher McGlade and Paul Ekins, ‘The
geographical distribution of fossil fuels
unused when limiting global warming to
2°C,’ (2015) Nature 517, 187-190, https://
www.nature.com/articles/nature14016.

4 ‘Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the
Global Energy Sector (2021) International
Energy Agency, https://www.iea.org/
reports/net-zero-by-2050, 11.

5 ‘America’s Zero Carbon Action Plan,’ (2020)
The Zero Carbon Consortium, https://irpcdn.multiscreensite.com/6f2c9f57/files/
uploaded/zero-carbon-action-plan%20
%281%29.pdf.

6 Goal 7: Ensure access to affordable,

At the same time that the vast majority of fossil fuel reserves must be left in the ground and
existing infrastructure retired, trillions of dollars will need to be invested for the world to scale
up access to affordable renewable energy.6 The zero-carbon energy transition will require
an unprecedented mobilization of financial resources towards investment in renewable
energy generation, transmission, distribution, and storage; retrofitting of existing
infrastructure; the development of new technologies; and carbon capture as needed.
The Paris Agreement acknowledges the need to Investment will be needed to “expand
infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy
services for all in developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small
island developing States and landlocked developing countries.”7 Fortunately,
many developing countries have tremendous renewable energy potential, particularly in
wind, solar, geothermal, and hydro power.8 Many also have the minerals necessary to
produce renewable energy technology—minerals which the rest of the world will
depend upon.9
Many regions depend on fossil fuel extraction for revenue as well, and the majority of fossil
fuel assets that must be stranded to achieve climate commitments are located within their
borders. For example, nine countries in Africa are represented in the top 40 countries with
the highest share of GDP coming from oil and gas revenues—dependence ranges from
12% to 81% of government revenues over a three year period.10 Lower income oilproducing countries will be hit especially hard as oil prices decrease, since the cost of
production will not be globally competitive as demand decreases.11
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reliable, sustainable and modern energy
for all, United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals, https://sdgs.un.org/
goals/goal7.

7 Goal 7, Target 7.b (n 6).
8 Jeffrey D. Sachs et al., ‘Roadmap to ZeroCarbon Electrification of Africa by 2050: The
Green Energy Transition and the Role of the
Natural Resource Sector (Minerals, Fossil
Fuels, and Land),’ (2021) https://ccsi.
columbia.edu/content/roadmap-zerocarbon-electrification-africa.

9 Martin Dietrich Brauch, “Reforming
International Investment Law for Climate
Change Goals” in Michael Mehling
and Harro van Asselt (eds) Research
Handbook on Climate Finance and
Investment (Edward Elgar, 2021) https://
academiccommons.columbia.edu/
doi/10.7916/d8-300v-7h63; Perrine
Toledano et al, “Don’t Throw Caution to the
Wind: In the Green Energy Transition, Not All
Critical Minerals Will Be Gold Mines” (CCSI,
2020) https://ccsi.columbia.edu/content/
dont-throw-caution-wind-green-energytransition-not-all-critical-minerals-will-begoldmines.

10 ‘Beyond Petrostates: The burning need to
cut oil dependence in the energy
transition,’ (2021) Carbon Tracker, https://
carbontracker.org/reports/petrostatesenergy-transition-report/.
11 Roadmap (n 8).
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Although they have contributed least to historic emissions, developing countries will be
the most impacted by climate change and the energy transition. Developing and emerging
economies in Africa, Asia, and the Americas are the most vulnerable to the physical and
financial impacts of climate change. They have the lowest levels of electrification and
the highest dependency on fossil fuels for energy. According to the most recent IPCC
report, at least 3.5 billion people live in places that already desperately need to adapt to
the impacts of climate change; the report estimates that developing countries alone will
require USD 127 billion per year for adaptation costs.12
It is crucial that these countries receive the foreign direct investment (FDI) and financial
support required to mitigate and adapt to climate change and to address climate-related
impacts and damages.13 The financing gap in developing countries is compounded by
poor sovereign risk ratings, due to ill-designed rating systems.14
Until recently, international investment law and policy has been largely overlooked
by negotiators at international climate change convenings such as the Conference of
the Parties (COPs) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), despite the important role it plays in either advancing or undermining efforts
to address climate change.
The most recent IPCC report recognizes that while investment treaties have the potential
to play a role in advancing necessary investments, the treaties as drafted risk delaying
or preventing necessary climate action.15 As recognized by the IPCC report, investor
protections granted through international investment law allow fossil fuel corporations,
other high-emitting investors, and their shareholders to sue governments over actions
and regulations—including those taken to comply with climate commitments—that
negatively impact their investments’ bottom lines.
However, a wholly new international investment regime designed with climate and other
global goals in mind could be used as a tool to accelerate the investments needed to
address the climate crisis and to facilitate international cooperation to achieve global
climate and other development goals.
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12 IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022:
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to
the Sixth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M.
Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A.
Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke,
V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)].
Cambridge University Press. In Press.
13 Martin Dietrich Brauch and Brenda
Akankunda, ‘Investment Governance
in Africa to Support Climate Resilience
and Decarbonization,’ (December 10,
2021), https://ccsi.columbia.edu/news/
investment-governance-africa-supportclimate-resilience-and-decarbonization.
See also Jeffry D. Sachs et al., ‘Roadmap
to Zero-Carbon Electrification of Africa
by 2050: The Green Energy Transition
and the Role of the Natural Resource
Sector (Minerals, Fossil Fuels, and Land),’
(2021) https://ccsi.columbia.edu/content/
roadmap-zero-carbon-electrificationafrica.
14 For more on this, see United Nations,
Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for
Development, Financing for Sustainable
Development Report 2022. (New York:
United Nations, 2022), available from:
https://developmentfinance.un.org/
fsdr2022, p. 23.
15 IPCC, 2022: Climate Change
2022: Mitigation of Climate Change.
Contribution of Working Group III to
the Sixth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al
Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum,
M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera,
M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz,
J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK and New York,
NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926,
Chapters 14 and 15.
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What are Investment
Treaties?

International investment law is made up of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties
and investment chapters included within trade agreements that afford protections and
privileges to foreign investors.16 The vast majority of the over 3,300 investment treaties
concluded to date (of which over 2,600 are in force) were signed with the expectation by
state parties that they would help to promote FDI, thereby advancing development, and
to strengthen diplomacy and the rule of law. Despite these assumptions, the evidence that
investment treaties achieve their aims of increasing investment, and thereby development
outcomes, is inconclusive, at best, and the extensive costs of the treaties for states and their
stakeholders are mounting.17
The investor protections enshrined in investment treaties are enforced through investor–
state dispute settlement (ISDS)—a private dispute settlement mechanism by which foreign
investors can directly sue host states for actions perceived to affect their interests.18
Although many treaties include clauses that specify certain exemptions or powers retained
by governments for measures taken in good faith and in the public interest, these provisions
have largely been overlooked, disregarded, or undermined by arbitrators.19
ISDS has been used to successfully challenge measures including:
▶

▶

▶

Changes to fiscal regimes;
Requirements that investors purchase local goods and services or invest in local research
and development;
Termination of contracts, revocation or termination of permits, or decisions not to grant
or renew permits;

▶

Requirements that investors to consult communities or compensate for harms;

▶

New or stronger environmental regulations and other changes to regulatory frameworks;

▶

Coal phase-outs; and

▶

Attempts to apply the polluter pays principle.20

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE AND ACHIEVING A JUST ZERO-CARBON FUTURE

16 For a deeper look into investment
treaties, see: ‘Primer on International
Investment Treaties and Investor-State
Dispute Settlement,’ (2022) Columbia
Center on Sustainable Investment, https://
ccsi.columbia.edu/content/primerinternational-investment-treaties-andinvestor-state-dispute-settlement.
17 Lise Johnson et al., ‘Costs and
Benefits of Investment Treaties: Practical
considerations for states,’ (2018) Columbia
Center on Sustainable Investment,
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/
files/content/pics/Cost-and-Benefitsof-Investment-Treaties-PracticalConsiderations-for-States-ENG-mr.
pdf; Joachim Pohl, ‘Societal Benefits
and Costs of International Investment
Agreements,’ (2018) OECD Working Papers
on International Investment, https://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-andinvestment/societal-benefits-and-costsof-international-investment-agreements_
e5f85c3d-en; Joe C. Brada et al., ‘Does
Investor Protection Increase Foreign
Direct Investment? A Meta-Analysis,’ (2020)
Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 35,
Issue 1, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/full/10.1111/joes.12392.
18 For more detailed information on
ISDS, see: ‘Primer on International
Investment Treaties and Investor-State
Dispute Settlement,’ (2022) Columbia
Center on Sustainable Investment, https://
ccsi.columbia.edu/content/primerinternational-investment-treaties-andinvestor-state-dispute-settlement.
19 For example, see Eco Oro v. Colombia,
ICSID Case No. ARB/16/41.
20 Lisa Sachs, et al., ‘Environmental
Injustice: How Treaties Undermine Human
Rights Related to the Environment,’ (2020)
La Revue de Juristes de Sciences Po N°18,
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/
files/content/docs/blog/revue-numero18-L.-Sachs_-Johnson_-Merill-nvestmentLaw-and-Environmental-Justice-.pdf.
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Investment Law and Policy
and Climate Goals

As policymakers increasingly adopt measures to address climate change—phasingout coal- or gas-fired power plants, implementing energy efficiency standards or
carbon-pricing schemes, revoking permits for the exploration or extraction of fossil fuel
resources, applying new zoning rules accounting for sea level rise, etc.—the profitability
of high-emission investments will be impacted. Similarly, policymakers may take other
fiscal or regulatory measures in response to changing market conditions for energy, even
if not explicitly climate-motivated. The potential impacts of these measures on various
investments would be similar to those that have, in the past, led to ISDS claims.21
Through ISDS, the cost of stranding assets and otherwise meeting climate mitigation
targets or adapting to climate change is shifted from the investor to states, taxpayers, and
energy consumers. Effectively, fossil fuel companies could be “reimbursed” when climate
measures hurt their bottom lines, despite having been warned for decades that the
burning of fossil fuels is the main cause of climate change and that their reserves were at
risk of stranding;22 even now, fossil fuel companies continue to explore for new reserves,
despite the IEA’s declaration that there is no case for additional fossil fuel exploration or
extraction. International investment law insulates investors against risks associated with
the energy transition, prolonging reckless investment in fossil fuels, and encouraging
investment in assets and practices that should have been abandoned years ago.23
One of the thousands of treaties that threatens climate action is the Energy Charter Treaty
(ECT), a treaty which was originally created to promote international cooperation in the
energy sector.24 Today, state parties to the ECT risk being held liable for important public
interest measures, including climate policy, under the ECT’s ISDS mechanism. In fact, the
ECT is the most frequently invoked investment treaty to date.25 A former employee of the
ECT secretariat became a “climate whistleblower” after stating that the ECT is not at all
Paris-compatible (a reference to the Paris Agreement). Highlighting that the motivation
behind a government measure is not relevant in ISDS disputes, she cited examples of
cases in Eastern Europe where governments face claims for changing laws to address
energy poverty. Were investors to continue bringing cases challenging climate policies,
she predicted that taxpayers would end up paying billions of dollars in damages to fossil
fuel investors.26
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21 Ibid.
22 Martin Dietrich Brauch and Brenda
Akankunda, ‘Investment Governance
in Africa to Support Climate Resilience
and Decarbonization,’ (December 10,
2021), https://ccsi.columbia.edu/news/
investment-governance-africa-supportclimate-resilience-and-decarbonization.
23 Kyla Tienhaara and Lorenzo Cotula,
‘Raising the cost of climate action?
Investor-state dispute settlement and
compensation for stranded fossil fuel
assets,’ (2020) International Institute
for Environment and Development,
https://pubs.iied.org/17660iied. See
also Martin Dietrich Brauch and Brenda
Akankunda, ‘Investment Governance
in Africa to Support Climate Resilience
and Decarbonization,’ (December 10,
2021), https://ccsi.columbia.edu/news/
investment-governance-africa-supportclimate-resilience-and-decarbonization.
24 Martin Dietrich Brauch, ‘Should the
European Union Fix, Leave or Kill the
Energy Charter Treaty,’ (2021) Columbia
Center on Sustainable Investment,
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/news/shouldeuropean-union-fix-leave-or-kill-energycharter-treaty.
25 Martin Dietrich Brauch and Brenda
Akankunda, ‘Investment Governance
in Africa to Support Climate Resilience
and Decarbonization,’ (December 10,
2021), https://ccsi.columbia.edu/news/
investment-governance-africa-supportclimate-resilience-and-decarbonization.
This piece uses the example of the Save
Lamu campaign, in which communities
were able to halt an undesired coal-fired
power plant project in Kenya.
26 Yamina Saheb in Investigate Europe,
‘Whistleblower Yamina Saheb on the
Energy Charter Treaty (2021) https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=w7GT_mrGX7Q;
Kyla Tienhaara et al., ‘Investor-state
disputes threaten the global green energy
transition,’ (May 2022) 376 Science 6594
https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/
science.abo4637, pp.701-703.
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Table 1: ISDS Cases Related to Measures Aimed at Mitigating or Adapting to Climate Change

Case Name

Treaty

Project Details

Amount
Claimed

Outcome

Challenged Policy Measure

Vattenfall v.
Germany (2009)

ECT

Moorburg coal-fired
power plant.

1.4 billion USD

Settled.

New administration imposes stricter water use
requirements and mandates construction of fish
ladder.

TRUenergy v.
Australia (2009)

Hong KongAustralia BIT

Local energy firm.

N/A

Threatened.

Compensation for coal-fired plants and other
heavy polluters under climate-related legislation.

Vattenfall v.
Germany II
(2012)

ECT

Two nuclear power
plants in Germany.

5.14 billion USD

Settled. Germany
paid total of 2.5
billion USD to four
energy companies.

Germany’s plan for nuclear phase-out by 2022.

Lone Pine v.
Canada (2013)

NAFTA

Hydraulic fracturing
(fracking) under St.
Lawrence River.

109.8 million USD

Pending.

Quebecois government moratorium on oil and
gas activity in certain ecologically vulnerable
areas leads to revoked petroleum and natural gas
exploration permits.

TransCanada v.
United States
(2016)

NAFTA

Keystone XL Pipeline
carrying crude
oil from Alberta
tar sands to U.S.
refineries.

15 billion USD

Settled.

U.S. President’s cancellation of pipeline citing
climate change concerns.

Rockhopper v.
Italy (2017)

ECT

Oil exploration in
Ombrina Mare field
located six miles
offshore.

N/A

Settled. Italy to pay
over 190 million USD.

Italian Government ban on oil and gas exploration
within 12 nautical miles of coastline.

Westmoreland v.
Canada (2018)

NAFTA

Coal mines
deliberately located
next to power
plants to cut export
infrastructure needs.

357 million USD

Discontinued.

Phase out of coal power plants by 2030.

Lama v. Canada
(2019)

Canada
– Czech
Republic BIT

Oil sands field in
Alberta, Canada.

Unknown

Notice of intent to
bring a claim.

Delays in regulatory approval following new,
environment and indigenous rights-friendly
administration.

Vermilion v.
France

ECT

Oil and gas company
with 26 extraction
sites in France.

Unknown

Threatened. Never
brought to bear
due to subsequent
weakening of
legislation.

French Environment Minister drafted law ending
fossil fuel extraction on French territory by 2040
and banning renewal of all exploitation permits.

Ascent Resouces
v. Slovenia (2020)

ECT

Fracking in Petišovci
oil and gas field
near critical water
sources.

Est. 126.7 million
USD

Notice of
intent. Slovenia
subsequently passed
law allowing some
fracking.

Slovenian Environment Agency asked investor to
conduct an environmental impact assessment,
required to obtain an environmental permit.

Uniper v. the
Netherlands
(2021)

ECT

One of the
Netherlands’ largest
coal-fired power
plant.

Est 1.06 billion
USD

Notice of dispute.

Dutch government plan to shutdown shut down
all coal-fired power plants by 2030.

RWE v. the
Netherlands
(2021)

ECT

Two coal-fired power
plants.

Est. 2.96 billion
USD

Pending.

Dutch government plan to shutdown shut down
all coal-fired power plants by 2030.

TC Energy v.
United States
(2021)

USMCA
NAFTA
Legacy
Provision

Keystone XL
Pipeline.

15 billion USD

Notice of intent.

Executive order revoking pipeline’s construction
permits.

Alberta PMC v.
United States
(2022)

NAFTA

Province-owned
Alberta. Petroleum
Marketing
Commission.

1 billion USD

Notice of dispute.

U.S. President’s cancellation of Keystone XL
pipeline.
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The threat alone of an ISDS case, or fear of ISDS cases, can discourage or prevent
governments from regulating investments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.27 This
phenomenon—regulatory chill—results from several factors: prohibitively high litigation
costs,28 high costs of adverse ISDS awards, and fear of damaged reputations. The average
amount investors seek in damages is 1.6 billion USD (there is no penalty for over-claiming),
and the average amount of an award is 437.5 million USD.29 In some countries, these
costs have piled up—Colombia, for example, has faced 17 cases since 2016, and Spain has
faced roughly over 50 arbitrations for retracting one sector-specific set of incentives in
response to a tariff deficit and a financial crisis.30

27 Kyla Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill in a
Warming World: The Threat to Climate Policy
Posed by Investor-State Dispute Settlement,’
Transnational Environmental Law Vol 7. Issue
2 (2018), https://www.cambridge.org/core/
journals/transnational-environmental-law/
article/regulatory-chill-in-a-warmingworld-the-threat-to-climate-policy-posedby-investorstate-dispute-settlement/
C1103F92D8A9386D33679A649FEF7C84.
28 The average cost of ISDS proceedings adds
up to USD 13 million for the claimant and
respondent together. ‘Primer on International
Investment Treaties and Investor-State Dispute
Settlement,’ (2022) Columbia Center on
Sustainable Investment, https://ccsi.columbia.

At least four of the cases included in Table 1—TransCanada v. United States, Westmoreland
v. Canada, Lama v. Canada, and Vermillion v. France—led to subsequent reversals of policy
by states, which then led investors to withdraw their claim, having achieved the desired
outcome.31 Though regulatory chill32 has long been discussed as an issue, it has been
difficult to document or measure. In recent years, however, more concrete evidence has
arisen, including in the climate policy space. In addition to the cases mentioned above, in
2022, policymakers in Denmark and New Zealand explicitly stated that the threat of ISDS
stalled their countries’ climate policymaking.33
Companies in the oil, gas, and mining sectors have filed about a quarter of all known
ISDS claims, and 29% of all known claims in 2021.34 They have been awarded 73.2 billion
USD by arbitral tribunals since 1995. Of the 14 known ISDS awards exceeding 1 billion
USD, 11 were awarded to oil, gas, and mining companies. Pending claims brought by oil,
gas, and mining amount to 99.1 billion USD as of 2021—this number does not include the
40 pending cases for which claim amounts have not been disclosed.35 In 2021, investors
initiated at least 68 known ISDS cases.36 All this to say, policymakers around the world
can reasonably expect treaty-based challenges from fossil fuel and other extractive
companies, investors involved in infrastructure or in the electricity sector, as well as other
types of investors, to increase in the years and decades to come.

edu/content/primer-international-investmenttreaties-and-investor-state-dispute-settlement.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid; UNCTAD, Investment Dispute Settlement
Navigator, Investment Dispute Settlement
Navigator https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
investment-dispute-settlement.
31 Martin Dietrich Brauch, ‘Climate Action
Needs Investment Governance, Not Investment
Protection and Arbitration,’ (2022) Columbia
Center on Sustainable Investment, https://ccsi.
columbia.edu/news/climate-action-needsinvestment-governance-not-investmentprotection-isds. See also Ella Merrill and Martin
Dietrich Brauch, ‘U.S. Climate Leadership Must
Reject ISDS: As the United States Faces Another
$15 Billion Suit from the Fossil Fuel Industry,
it’s Time for President Biden to Take a Decisive
Stance,’ (2021) Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment, https://ccsi.columbia.edu/news/
us-climate-leadership-must-reject-isds-unitedstates-faces-another-15-billion-suit-fossil-fuel.
32 For more on regulatory chill, see: Kyla
Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill in a Warming World:
The Threat to Climate Policy Posed by InvestorState Dispute Settlement,’ (2018) Transnational
Environmental Law Vol. 7 Issue 2, https://www.
cambridge.org/core/journals/transnationalenvironmental-law/article/regulatory-chill-ina-warming-world-the-threat-to-climate-policyposed-by-investorstate-dispute-settlement/
C1103F92D8A9386D33679A649FEF7C84; Julia
Brown, ‘International Investment Agreements:
Regulatory Chill in the Face of Litigious Heat,’
(2013) Western Journal of Legal Studies, Volume
3, Issue 1, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2617369.
33 Elizabeth Meager, ‘COP26 targets pushed
back under threat of being sued,’ (2022) Capital
Monitor, https://capitalmonitor.ai/institution/
government/cop26-ambitions-at-risk-fromenergy-charter-treaty-lawsuits/.
34 Manuel Perez Rocha, ‘Missing from the
Climate Talks: Corporate Powers to Sue
Governments Over Extractives Policies,’ (2021)
Inequality.org, https://inequality.org/research/
missing-from-the-climate-talks-corporatepowers-to-sue-governments-over-extractivespolicies/; Leo di Salvatore, ‘Investor-State
Disputes in the Fossil Fuel Industry,’ (2021)
International Institute for Sustainable
Development, https://www.iisd.org/
publications/report/investor-state-disputesfossil-fuel-industry.
35 Extractives brief; Manuel Perez Rocha,
‘Missing from the Climate Talks: Corporate
Powers to Sue Governments Over Extractives
Policies,’ (2021) Inequality.org, https://
inequality.org/research/missing-from-theclimate-talks-corporate-powers-to-suegovernments-over-extractives-policies/.
36 UNCTAD, Investment Dispute Settlement
Navigator, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.
org/investment-dispute-settlement.
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A New Vision for International
Investment Governance37

Simply attempting to re-balance the international investment regime by refining certain
investor protections, and to mitigate the harms of a system which provides little benefit to
states, does not address the fundamental misalignment of investment treaties with both
the globally-agreed climate goals and the broader sustainable development agenda.38
Recent attempts to avoid certain harms through special provisions have not proven
effective. For example, tribunals have ignored or minimized exceptions or carve-outs
protecting certain types of measures from ISDS claims,39 and investors can circumvent
them in the framing of the claim. Many proposed reforms rely on interpretation and
application by party-appointed arbitrators, who have an interest in finding jurisdiction
over cases,40 or fail to remedy other harmful aspects of the system, such as the exclusion
of important voices from proceedings. The overarching issue is that the harms of
investment treaties, even with the proposed reforms, outweigh the uncertain benefits.
As noted, billions of dollars must be mobilized worldwide towards mitigation and
adaptation, and foreign direct investment will play an important role. States have an
opportunity to think critically about how investment governance can serve and support
climate goals at the state and international levels moving forward. Specifically:
1. Treaties could promote investments that aid state parties in advancing climate and
energy commitments and needs, including with respect to mitigation, universal
access to affordable renewable energy, and climate adaptation. States should ensure
that treaties do not promote investments that undermine this progress.
2. Treaties could strengthen domestic governance and public institutions. Meeting
the climate crisis will require robust regulation and enforcement. Treaties should
empower states to regulate investment in line with climate commitments and human
rights standards.
3. Treaties could serve as means of addressing gaps in transnational climate governance
and prevent regulatory races to the bottom.
These objectives are considered in turn below.

1 | Promoting Climate-Aligned Investment and Preventing Harms
FDI is needed to achieve rapid decarbonization41 and universal access to affordable
renewable energy.42 For many countries, the path to net-zero will require, among other
measures, the pursuit of strong, flexible, and digitized centralized grids; decentralized,
affordable connection to grids, mini-grids and solar power systems; national digitization
transformations; and the electrification of transportation. Fossil fuel subsidies will need
to be dropped.43
Furthermore, the Paris Agreement takes into account the “imperative of a just transition
of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs.”44 Technology and
skills must be transferred to host countries so that its citizens may stand to benefit from
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37 This section draws significantly from
a three-pillar framework introduced in
a 2019 paper by the Columbia Center
on Sustainable Investment (CCSI). Lise
Johnson et al., ‘Aligning International
Investment Agreements with the
Sustainable Development Goals,’ (2019)
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
58-1, https://ccsi.columbia.edu/content/
aligning-investment-treaties-sustainabledevelopment.
38 Martin Dietrich Brauch, ‘Reforming
International Investment Law for Climate
Change Goals,’ (2020) Research Handbook
on Climate Finance and Investment,
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., https://
academiccommons.columbia.edu/
doi/10.7916/d8-300v-7h63. See also Martin
Dietrich Brauch, ‘Climate Action Needs
Investment Governance, Not Investment
Protection and Arbitration,’ (2022) Columbia
Center on Sustainable Investment, https://
ccsi.columbia.edu/news/climate-actionneeds-investment-governance-notinvestment-protection-isds.
39 ‘Primer on International Investment
Treaties and Investor-State Dispute
Settlement,’ (2022) Columbia Center
on Sustainable Investment, https://
ccsi.columbia.edu/content/primerinternational-investment-treaties-andinvestor-state-dispute-settlement; For
example, in Eco Oro v. Colombia (ICSID
Case No. ARB/16/14) or Odyssey v. Mexico
(ICSID Case No. UNCT/20/1).
40 David Gaukrodger and Kathryn Gordon,
‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A
scoping paper for the investment policy
community,’ (2012) OECD Working
Papers on International Investment,
OECD Publishing, https://www.oecd.org/
investment/investment-policy/WP-2012_3.
pdf, page 47.
41 Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat
climate change and its impacts, United
Nations Sustainable Development Goals,
https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal13.
42 Goal 7: Ensure access to affordable,
reliable, sustainable and modern energy
for all, United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals, https://sdgs.un.org/
goals/goal7.
43 Jeffry D. Sachs et al., ‘Roadmap to ZeroCarbon Electrification of Africa by 2050:
The Green Energy Transition and the Role
of the Natural Resource Sector (Minerals,
Fossil Fuels, and Land),’ (2021) https://ccsi.
columbia.edu/content/roadmap-zerocarbon-electrification-africa.
44 Paris Agreement (2015) United Nations,
Preamble, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/
files/english_paris_agreement.pdf.
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those transfers, as well as related advances such as a digitization transformation.45
However, many investment treaties restrict performance requirements or technology
transfers, making it difficult for developing countries to attract and leverage the
beneficial investment they need to transform the economy through quality jobs and new
technologies.
Investment treaties should be reimagined as tools to promote renewable energy, the
creation of “green” jobs, technological and industrial innovation, and digital access.
They should discourage investments whose practices or products are inconsistent with
the realization of climate or other sustainable development goals. As previously noted,
investment treaties indemnify investments that undermine climate commitments. In
addition to eliminating those protections, treaties could also mitigate harms by limiting
or eliminating fossil fuel subsidies or other regulatory or fiscal incentives or subsidies
undermining climate goals.

2 | Strengthening Governance and Preserving Regulatory Space
Investment treaties allow foreign investors to bypass domestic institutions and processes,
bringing claims for alleged harms directly to private arbitration. Investors also challenge
the outcomes of domestic judicial and administrative processes when the outcomes
undermine their interests.46 Investment treaties disregard the principle of equality before
the law by granting stronger protections to investors as compared to other private parties,
and by making it possible to ignore the rights and interests of other parties affected by
investments, including local communities, Indigenous Peoples, and domestic investors.47
ISDS could be described as a form of political risk insurance (PRI) (as it has particularly
in the case of stranded fossil fuel assets) but there are several key differences between
ISDS, which is granted to the investor “for free” by the state, and PRI, which investors
must purchase through the private sector. Through its purchase, PRI requires investors to
internalize at least some of the costs of risky investment activities or decisions. Because
they will bear some of the cost, investors have less incentive to take risks. If the price
for PRI for carbon intensive investments were high enough, and ISDS did not provide
additional indemnification from stranded assets, investors would assume greater risks if
they continued to pursue fossil-fuel-based activities.48
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45 Jeffry D. Sachs et al., ‘Roadmap to ZeroCarbon Electrification of Africa by 2050:
The Green Energy Transition and the Role
of the Natural Resource Sector (Minerals,
Fossil Fuels, and Land),’ (2021) https://ccsi.
columbia.edu/content/roadmap-zerocarbon-electrification-africa.
46 Maria Rocha et al., ‘Advocates Say
ISDS Is Necessary Because Domestic
Courts Are ‘Inadequate,’ But Claims and
Decisions Don’t Reveal Systemic Failings,’
(2021) Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment, https://ccsi.columbia.edu/
news/advocates-say-isds-necessarybecause-domestic-courts-are-inadequateclaims-and-decisions-dont.
47 Lisa Sachs and Lise Johnson,
“Investment Treaties, Investor-State
Dispute Settlement and Inequality: How
International Rules and Institutions Can
Exacerbate Domestic Disparities,” in
José Antonio Ocampo, ed., International
Rules and Inequality: Implications for
Global Economic Governance (Columbia
University Press), 2019.
48 Lise Johnson et al, ‘Alternatives to
Investor-State Dispute Settlement,’
(2019) Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment Working Paper 2019, https://
ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/
content/docs/our%20focus/extractive%20
industries/Alternatives-to-ISDS-11April-2019.pdf, pp. 6 and 7.
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International investment law should protect and strengthen domestic judicial systems,
rather than bypass or undermine them. International investment law could strengthen
states’ administrative and judicial systems by requiring the exhaustion of local remedies
and by allowing international review only in instances of alleged gross denial of justice
claims, which could be resolved through state-state dispute settlement.49 Proponents
of ISDS often claim that the mechanism is necessary because domestic courts can be
“inadequate”—whether that means they lack capacity, are susceptible to corruption, or
are biased in some way. Research, however, does not support this conclusion: as of 31
July 2020, only 11% of known ISDS treaty-based claims regarded challenges to judicial
proceedings or decisions, and investors were mostly unsuccessful in those claims (while
they are mostly successful in other ISDS claims).50 ISDS remains unique in the realm of
public international law as the only avenue to remedy that enables claimants to skip or
bypass domestic courts. Under international human rights law, in comparison, claimants
are required to exhaust local remedies, thus giving the state both a chance and an
incentive to address harms before claims are brought under international law.51

3 | Encouraging and Facilitating Cooperation
Finally, investment treaties could help to address investment governance challenges
of an international, continental, and regional nature – those related to climate change
foremost among them. For example, treaties could include commitments by state parties
to work together to share information and opportunities for investment projects that
support common climate goals. They could facilitate cooperation between state parties in
developing and sharing technologies used to accelerate the energy transition, including
in energy efficiency, renewable electricity, grids, green hydrogen, battery production
and recycling, and climate-resilient infrastructure.52 They could also include financial
commitments and mechanisms to ensure that all states have adequate resources to
invest in zero-carbon energy, contributing to both climate action and universal energy
access, as well as in other mitigation measures, and in climate resilience and adaptation.
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49 See, Martin Dietrich Brauch, ‘Exhaustion
of Local Remedies in International
Investment Law,’ (2017) IISD Best Practices
Series, https://www.iisd.org/system/files/
publications/best-practices-exhaustionlocal-remedies-law-investment-en.pdf,
pp. 24 and 26
50 Maria Rocha, Martin Dietrich Brauch,
and Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye, ‘Advocates
Say ISDS is Necessary Because Domestic
Courts Are ‘Inadequate,’ But Claims and
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52 See, for instance, Article 2.3 of the Model
Treaty on Sustainable Investment (TSI) for
Climate Mitigation and Adaptation, Art.
2.3 https://martinbrauch.files.wordpress.
com/2022/04/treaty-on-sustainableinvestment-for-climate-change-mitigationand-adaptation.pdf. See also Brooke
Skartvedt Güven and Lise Johnson,
‘Trading in the Balance: Reconciling Trade
and Climate Policy,’ (2016) Report of the
Working Group on Trade, Investment, and
Climate Policy, https://ccsi.columbia.
edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/
Trade-in-the-Balance-InternationalInvestment-Agreements-Impacts-onClimate-Change-Policies-in-India-Chinaand-Beyond-Nov-2016.pdf ; Martin Dietrich
Brauch, ‘Climate Action Needs Investment
Governance, Not Investment Protection
and Arbitration,’ (2022) Columbia Center
on Sustainable Investment, https://ccsi.
columbia.edu/news/climate-action-needsinvestment-governance-not-investmentprotection-isds.
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Considerations
for States

The international investment law regime requires a significant reimagining for it to
become consistent with and supportive of global climate goals. Reforms proposed
to address these issues within existing investment treaties will prove ineffective and
insufficient. The climate crisis joins earlier calls for the entire system to be turned on its
head—investments that facilitate a zero-carbon future should be encouraged; investments
that stand in the way should be phased out. States must retain the regulatory space
needed to take effective action. And international cooperation is critical in mobilizing the
finance, technology, and resources needed to make this all possible.
The greatest opportunity for states is to design wholly new treaties that are tailored
to the specific constraints, drivers, and governance challenges related to sustainable
investment. As discussed above, treaties centered around enforceable investor
protections have not been effective at mobilizing investment. Investor protections also
constrain governments’ ability to use various fiscal and policy tools to attract, shape, and
finance investment. Governments could consider how investment treaties could support
governments’ policy objectives and foster supportive international commitments and
collaboration related to climate goals, including mitigation (the zero-carbon energy
transition in particular) and adaptation.

Existing Investment Treaties
For existing treaties, the most effective way for states to limit their exposure to claims
and to regulatory pressure from the threat of claims would be to terminate or withdraw
consent to arbitration.53 In treaties unilaterally terminated or from which treaty partners
withdraw, a sunset clause may allow claims to be brought for a decade or longer after
the treaty is terminated or after withdrawal. For example, though Italy withdrew from
the ECT in 2016, the U.K. offshore oil investor Rockhopper was able to successfully bring
a claim in 2017 through the twenty year sunset clause.54 Accordingly, an optimal way
to pursue termination or withdrawal from investment treaty, or withdrawal of consent
to arbitration would be through the agreement of all treaty parties (to first remove the
sunset clause) or through a multilateral convention, like that concluded by EU member
states.55 States could encourage such multilateral coordination through existing fora,
such as United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s Working Group III
on Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform56 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).57

Anticipating Claims
States can also begin to prepare for the eventuality of claims related to regulation of
fossil fuels or other high-emitting sectors. States might work with academics and civil
society organizations to understand how international commitments, climate science, or
considerations like the depreciating value of oil and gas58 might be relevant factors in
disputes that might arise.
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ARB/17/14.
55 ‘EU Member States sign an agreement
for the termination of intra-EU
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States should also strongly consider the potential for ISDS claims before further actions
to explore for or extract fossil fuels or related infrastructure.
Finally, states might use tools available under international law, such as joint
interpretative statements, to minimize uncertainties regarding the degree of regulatory
space preserved for states under investment treaties,59 and otherwise to confirm the
importance and relevance of international law, including climate and human rights
commitments and frameworks.
Specific approaches to interpretation have been proposed, such as issuing joint
declarations that clarify investment treaties do not ‘constrain climate change measures
enacted in good faith.’60 Additionally, references in treaty provisions and preambles to
multilaterally agreed-upon standards such as the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the UN Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights could be included.61 It’s important to note, however, that while useful,
these interpretative approaches do not carry the same weight as treaty language designed
to establish ‘legal clarity’ and reduce interpretive discretion left to tribunals.62
These measures will only provide limited forms of protection against claims. Arbitral
tribunals are not required to consider interpretations of investment treaties issued
unilaterally by states, for example, and may not give appropriate weight to joint
interpretative statements. But clarifications and preparing for possible cases and
defenses can potentially mitigate the damage of future cases.

Drafting New Treaties
The greatest opportunity for states is to design wholly new treaties as tools for meeting
their own development goals and international obligations, including meeting
internationally agreed upon emissions commitments. Most crucially, when drafting
new treaties, states should consider the three pillars above—that treaties thoughtfully
promote investments that contribute to climate and other sustainable development goals,
including by identifying and addressing the actual constraints to those investments; that
they strengthen domestic governance, protect states’ regulatory space, and promote the
rule of law; and that they facilitate international cooperation for governance challenges
of an international nature—and draft provisions that meet and promote these objectives.
59 Ladan Mehranvar and Lise Johnson,
“Missing Masters: Causes, Consequences,
and Corrections for States’ Disengagement
from the Investment Treaty System”
(2022) Journal of International Dispute
Settlement, Oxford University, https://doi.
org/10.1093/jnlids/idac008.
60 UNCTAD, World Investment Report
2010 (UNCTAD, 2010) https://unctad.org/
system/files/official-document/wir2010_
en.pdf ; Lise Johnson et al., ‘Aligning
International Investment Agreements
with the Sustainable Development Goals,’
(2019) Columbia Journal of Transnational
Law 58-1, https://ccsi.columbia.edu/
content/aligning-investment-treatiessustainable-development.
61 UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework
for Sustainable Development (UNCTAD 2015)
https://unctad.org/system/files/officialdocument/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf, 83.
62 UNCTAD, UNCTAD’s Reform Package
for the International Investment Regime
(UNCTAD, 2018) https://investmentpolicy.
unctad.org/uploaded-files/document/
UNCTAD_Reform_Package_2018.pdf.
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